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I. FOCAL RISEARCH INTEREST
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.S.Arrry air defense community is facing a period of
significant change. New weapon systerrs are being fielded
while tactics, doctrine ana commend end cortrol ( C2 ) systems
to maximize the effectiveness of the new weapon systems are
being developed and improved upon. Ground based air defense
activities impact en the airspace ever the ground forces.
This necessitates a joint effort between the Army and the
Air Force in the development of doctrine and command and
control systerrs to (1) provide maximurr air defense
protection and (2) enhance friendly aircraft survivability.
The Joint forward Area Air Defense (JJAAD) office of
Training and Systems Analysis Activity (TRASANA) has
proponency for the joint service problems of airspace
management ana aircraft identification. Concurrently the
short range air defense (SHCRAD) C2 project rranager's office
has proponency for developing an Army SHCRAD-C2 system.
Requirements for a new C2 system are a composite of user
inputs from the U.S. Army Air Defense School (USAADS) at Ft.
Bliss, Tx. ana parameters based on riCOM analysis efforts.
Meanwhile, several companies have already developed
hardware, software and/or system design concepts to improve




The objective of this thesis is to describe two
competing automatic SHORAD-Cc systerrs (systerr capabilities)
and to evaluate therr against operational requirements
(identify shortfalls). Eoth systerrs, one by Defense Systems
Division of Senders Associates and the other oy Litton Lata
Systems, were developed with off the shelf ce pa bill ties.
C. 5ACKGB0UND
1 . U.S. Arrrv Air Defense
Air defense weapon systems can be divided into two
categories: (1) systems that support high-to-rediurr altitude
air defense (HINAD) which typically engage aircraft above
5000 feet end, (2) systems that are classified as short
range air defense (SHORAD) which engage, aircraft below 5CK0
feet, Figure 1 depicts the unclassified engagement envelops
cf the various systems to assist in systerr definition and
classification.
The weapon systems that are currently in the HIMAD
category are IHAWK, Patriot and NiKe Hercules. HIMAD weapon
systems are either corps or theater assets though they may
be deployed in the division area and/cr in direct support of
the division. KIPAD has automated Cc systems with adequate
capabilities ard will not be pursued in this thesis.
SHCBAD systems consist of the Vulcan, Chaparral and
Stinger with the Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun to be
1?

fielded in the near future as a replacement for the Vulcan.
SHCRAD units can be designated as either divisional or non-
divisional. The erphasis of this research effort will focus













The Vulcan is a surface-to-air gun system that
consists of a six barrel, 20-rrm, automatic cannon mounted
either on a tracked armored chasis (self-propelled) or on a
trailor chasis (tewed; to be pulled by a 1 1/4 ton or larger
vehicle, loth systems are equipped with on-vehicle intra-
ccmmunicaticns between crew members, as well as, voice radio
communications to platoon and/or supported unit nets. The
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other major components of the system are a sighting system
consisting of a lead-computing sight, a telescope, a night
vision sight, and a range only radar. The range only radar
provides input to the lead-computing sight once the operator
is tracking the target.
The canncn is an electrically powered, air
cooled rotary weapon. It fires electric primer ammunition
at selected rates of 1000 or £000 rounds per minute. The
operator may also select the burst length of 10, 30, 60, or
100 rounds wniie in the high rate of fire mode and has
continuous control in the low rate of fire. The self-
propelled Vulcan has an on-coard storage capability of
approximately 1100 rounds. The towed Vulcan can only carry
50e rounds but, has the advantage of a limited reloading
capability while remaining in action. The air defense
ammunition is high explosive incendiary tracer — self
destruct (BEIT-SI)). It is self-destructing to prevent
injury and/or aarrege to friendly ground forces since the air
defense Fission requires 360 degree engagements. The time
of flight before self-destructing limits the range to
approximately 1220 meters.
Both versions (SP and tewed) are capable of high
speed travel on improved roads while the SP has a better
rough terrain capability. The SP Vulcan can perform limited
amphibious operations. The towed version has the advantage
of being air transportable by the CH-47 and the BlackhawK
19

helicopters. For this reason, airborne, air assault ana
light infantry divisions normally are equipped with towed
Vulcan, while mechanized and armor divisions are authorized
the SP.
b. Division Air Defense (DIVAS) Gun
The DIVAD is a surface-tc-air gun system that
consists of a twin barrel, 35mm, automatic cannon rrounted on
an M-46 tan* chasis. The systerr has an on-ocard target
acquisition and interrogation capability. The vehicle is
equipped with intra-ccmmunications between crew members and
raiio communications with higher headquarters.
The automatic tracking systems allow the system
to shoot while on the rrove. This system also irrproves the
overall systen lethality which results in decreasing
ammunition expenditure.
c. Chaparral
Chaparral is a self-prcpelled , surface-to-air
guided missile system consisting of two rrajor subsystems;
the carrier and the launching station. The carrier is an
unarmored full-tracked vehicle capable of cross country
travel as well as noderate speeds over improved roads. The
carrier, with system and crew, can ford streams up to 40
inches in depth and with the swim icit installed can cress
water barriers as long as waves do not exceed one foot.
The launching station is an independent weapon
system capable of launching missiles when mated to or
2£

separated from the carrier. The launching station,
therefore, can ce airlifted by CE-4? helicopter to a remote
location for special operations. The launching station
carries twelve rrissiles, four on launch rails and eight in
storage compartments . There are two major components to the
launching station, a tase structure and a rrount which
contain the sever, suc-systems: power, rrcunt erection-
retraction, mount drive, rrissile control and launch, missile
air, environmental control, and communications. The base
structure merely houses some of the functional subsystems
while the mount provides the gunner the means for aiming and
launching missiles. There is an ongoing modification
program to upgrade all Chaparral systems by adding an
identification friend or foe (III) capability.
The missile is a supersonic surface-to-air
modified Sidewinder missile that uses a passive infrared
(IB; target detection and a proportional navigation guidance
control system. The guidance section senses the IB
radiation of the target to determine the direction to the
target and generates signals to the control fins. The
improved missile is capable of engageing aircraft flying
directly at the weapon system and has the feature of a
smokeless rocuet motor which leaves no trail bacu to the
weapon system. Considered a "fire and forget" system, there
is no control nor failsafe capability from the ground once
the missile is launchec The target detecting device acts
21

as a proximity fuze as well as a means for destruction on
contact .
d. Stinger
The Stinger is a man portable air defense
(PANPAE) shoulder fired system whose major components
consist of a missile and a launcber unit. The launcher has
several ccrrpcrents to enable the gunner to aim, tract,
interrogate, lock-on and fire on hosti.e targets. The
interrogation function is performed thru IFF equipment
attached to the launcher.
The missile is a supersonic, surface-to-air
missile that also uses passive IB homing and proportional
navigation guidance. The seeKer is capable of locking on
ana engaging head on aspect targets despite the shielding of
the majority of the IR source by the aircraft. The system
uses a one shot and tbrow away concept and, like the
Chaparral, possesses the fire and forge 1: characteristic.
This enables the team to move immediately alter tiring, to
enhance crew survivability.
Stinger teams are authorized a 1/4 ton utility
vehicle (jeep) with a trailer. This provides crew and
equipment with battlefield mobility as well as a command
post. The team can operate independent of tee vehicle with
a reduced missile capability. The radio can be removed from





The division air defense officer, SEOEAD
battalion commander , is responsible for providing air
defense protection to assets within the division area. He
must utilize the available SHORAD systems to maximize
coverage of critical assets and minimize darrage from aerial
attack. There are four basic missions that the air defense
units must be able to accomplish. Table I shows the
distribution of missions by percentage of time a SECRAD unit
in a heavy division could expect to be engaged in a
particular type of defense as well as general location
within tbe division area. [Ref. lj
TABLE I
SEORAD MISSIONS
Mission location Behind FIBA
i0e%




















The typical SBORAE battalion consists of a
headquarters battery and four firing batteries. The sensor
platoon is organic to the headquarters battery. The firing
batteries eacn have four firing platoons. Cne of the four
platoons in each battery is a Stinger platoon. The other
three platoons are all Vulcan in a Vulcan oattery and all



































Figure 2. SHCRAE Battalion Organization
The Chaparral/Vulcan platoons are authorized
four weapon systems for a total of twelve in each type
battery and twenty-four of each systerr within a division.
(Airborne/Air assault divisions have only towed Vulcan and
will not be described here.) When tactically deployed, the
firing batteries are norually task organized by platoons to
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provide rraximurr protection to the assets teat the division
coirrranaer has designated as air defense priorities. The
general rule fcr weapon system deployment is to utilize the
motility of Stinger and Vulcan systems forward with the
maneuver units while Chaparral supports division rear area
assets .
Though the Stinger systems are organic to the
SECRAD battalion, the nurrber of tears that are authorized is
cased on the nurrber of infantry, armor, field artillery
battalions and arrrored cavalry squadrons in the division.
The total number of tearrs will vary depending upon how many
battalions/squadrons are in a given type division. For
example, a mechanized infantry division with ten battalions
is authorized 67 teams. In this type division then, there
are a total of 115 firing units where each SHORAD weapon
system constitutes a firing unit.
4. Early Warning
fohen SHCRAD weapon systerrs were first fielded in the
mid 196Z's, it became readily apparent that a system for
alerting fire units to aircraft approach was essential.
"Figure Z is a summation of the results of rrany studies that
provided quantit if iable Information. . .thai
—
alerted SHORAD
gunners perform better than non-alerted gunners." [Ref. 2]
These early studies led to the current C2 procedures in the
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In operational divisions there are two means cf
providing early warning to firir.g units. One system
utilizes sensors designed specifically for SHCRAD alerting,
while the second taices advantage of other sensors in the
division area.
(1) forward Area Alerting Radar—Target Alert
lata listlay Set (FAAR-TAEES
|
. fAAB-TADLS xas designed to
provide early warning consisting of general location and
tentative identification of aerial targets that are within
17 kilorreters cf tte radar. Tnere are eight PAAR in the
SHCRAE battalion (see figure 2). These radars can be either
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centrally controlled or attached. to the Chaparral/Vulcan
batteries. The radar shelter is mounted on a 1 1/4 ten
cargo truck (gama goat). According to the field rranual for
errpJacing the FAAR system, FM 44-5, it requires 20-30
minutes tc set up and begin operations depending upon
weather, terrain and the tactical situation. The system
uses doppler shift to acquire proving targets at speeds in
excess of 40 knots and can detect hovering helicopters due
to the rate of blade rotation.
Acquired targets are displayed on a control
indicator and are challenged either manually cr
automatically depending upon [rode of operation and unit
standard operating procedure. Eased on the III response,
the operator then presses a "friend" or "foe" pushbutton
which displays appropriate symbcicgy on the indicator scope
end simultaneously transmits the deta via radio frequency
data link (B3FDI) to any potential TALES users within line of
sig^t and EM transmit/receive range restrictions of that
FAAR.
Every firing unit within the division is
authorized a TADDS for obtaining early warning data.- The
TAIIS contains an I'M receiver and a decoder that processes
the RFDI signal from the FAIR. The information is displayed
on a 7 by 7 square matrix, where each of the forty-nine
squares represent a five kilometer square on the ground.
T*ithin each square are two discs: a green disc indicates the
27

presence of <? friendly aircraft over that five square
kilometers wh;.le an orange disc indicates an unknown
aircraft. Both green and orange discs within a square may
be displayed at any one tiire. However, no indication as to
the number cf aircraft is provided witfa either disc
presentation .
(2) Early Warning Broadcast Net (EWBN). The
EWBN is a one-way voice-tell IM net which originates at the
division or SHCRAD battalion tactical operations center
(TOC). The net depends upon the local division structure
and is not standard. Its primary purpose is to pass long-
range track information to fire units throughout the
division. This net will be discussed in greater detail in
chapter two, paragraph 36.
b. Automated Early Warning
HI PAD systems have organic radars with long-
range acquisition capabilities and state of the art
autonated systems to provide early warning, target
identification, selection of priority targets, and
engagement sequences. This assists in the engagement of
targets at the earliest time and may afford reengagement of
targets as well as limit occurrences of simultaneous
engagement.
Firing doctrine varies with the tactical
situation to provide the best mix of firepower and missile
conservation. The doctrine of "shcct-look-shcot " provides
28

for reengagement cf targets not destroyed by initial fires.
"Ripple fire" is firing a series of trissiles frorr one unit
at predetermined Intervals between launches without waiting
for intercept of prior launches. (Systerr limitations
preclude the later firing doctrine for Nike Hercules.)
( 1 ) Application of the lawson Model. SHORAD
weapon systems dc not enjoy the luxury of automation for any
portion cf the engagement sequence. The Lawson vodel cf the
corrrrand and control process (see Figure 4) provides a
reference fcr examining the SEORAE engagement sequence.
IRef. Z] The model consists of four functions: SENSE,
COMPARE, EICIEE, and ACT. Each function relates to the
engagement process in the following manner:
o SENSE
Eire unit personnel search the environment for aircraft.
The sensing function ends with aircraft detection.
c COMPARE
The fire unit then attempts to determine the aircraft
identity by comparison.
c DECILE
Cnce identified, the squad/team leader must decide
whether cr not tc engage.
o ACT
The fire unit takes appropriate action, which commences





figure 4. Corrmand and Control Process
Each of tee above finctions rray consist of
one or uore processes. The processes will be described
within the appropriate function title. SENSE function: The
acquisition process is assisted by the EAAR-TADDS system but
fire unit personnel must visually acquire the target.
COMPARE function: Once an aircraft has been detected, the
squaa/tearr leader rrust determine if the aircraft is hostile
or not. He does this by means of visual aircraft
recognition techniques ana within the definition of hostile
criteria.
"Hostile criteria includes but is not limited to
observing an:
- Aircraft attacking friendly troops or a defended
asset.
- Aircraft having the markings/configuration of an
aircraft belonging to an enery force." [Ref. 4]
This is the identification phase. EECIDE function: Once
30

identified as hostile the squad/tear leader decides to
engage based on system range capabilities. ACT Function:
Having decided to engage the aircraft, the first act is to
give the fire ccrrmand. All subsequent actions are part cf
the act function.
(2) Engagement Prccess. The procedures for
engaging an aircraft with a Stlrger system are
representative of ail SHOBAD systerrs and will be used as an
example. Given the fire corrirand, the gunner must activate
the weapon systerr and "lock-on" the infrarea radiation from
the target aircraft. The final stage is to superelevate,
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Figure 5. Stinger Engagement Process
cf the target (head on, crossing, outgcing) while
superelevation is required to prevent the missile from
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bitting the ground on launch for lew flying targets. All of
these phases of the engagement process are manually executed
ana consume a consideraole amount of tiire. Figure 5
portrays the Stinger engagement sequence on a timeline with
the command and control process superimposed.
The above described n-anual engagement system
presents a sharp contrast to the highly automated HI^AD
systems. The HIPAD systems can also detect targets at lecg
range through their organic radars. SHCRAE, en the other
hand, has no radars organic to the weapon systems and no


















Figure 6. Engagement Time vs. Acquistion Range
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(3) Tirre and Distance Approach,. Figure 6
depicts a con-iron sense approach to the physical properties
of tirre, speed and distance when associated with air defense
systems and aircraft operations. Acquisition range, when
applied to SHCfiAD, is the range frcrr the target to the tire
unit when the supporting radar detects the target. Total
engagement time in both cases (HIMAD and SECRAD) is the
amount of time required from sensor detection of a target to
get either a rrissile or bullets into the air at that
particular target. HIMAD systerrs rreet the parameters for
the upper left quadrant while SHCRAE state of the art falls
into the lower right category. No SH0PAD-C2 system should
exhibit characteristics that allow this to continue. The
system rrust rrcve SHCRAD into one of the adjacent quadrants.
Obviously, there are three possible ways to better the
current SHORAD early earning capability: either increase the
acquisition range or decrease the reaction time or both.
Two disadvantages to increasing sensor
acquisition range as a sole solution are:
o as radar range (power) increases, they are more easily
located by direction finding techniques.
o masking associated with positioning of sensors for




The approach to decreasing engagement tire,
therefore, must be examined. In reviev of the engagement
process depicted in Figure 5, it would "be extremely costly
to redesign the weapon system in order to decrease the fixed
system reaction tire. Even then, a new system design would
produce very little time savings since system reaction time
was a factor in the design of the current systems. However,
the time consumed in the sense, compare, and decide
functions, with emphasis on sensing, has the potential for
substantial reduction. The hypothetical situation that
follows may help demonstrate that potential.
Were the FAAR control indicator placed right
in front of the Stinger team leader, removing the need for
target extraction and transr. ission by the FAAR operator,
there would be a savings of some time. The accuracy of a
properly oriented control indicator wculd irrprcve the visual
acquisition time cf the team over the gross positional data
(5 fcm square when properly oriented) of the TADTS. Cnce
detected by the team, visual aircraft recognition techniques
are required for proper identifi cation of the aircraft
before further action can be taken.
This example was given not to suggest the
placement of a FAAR at each fire unit but, to demonstrate,
in general terms, that the acquisition time can re reduced.
That reduction can be accomplished thru the automation of
information processing to simulate the real-time presence of
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sensor data at the fire unit. The closer to real-tire that
processing ceccn-es, the less engagement tirre is consumed.
1C

II. NATURE OF THE fRCBIEl"
A. THE TBPEAT
The Soviet Union poses the trost sophisticated and.
numerically significant air threat that the U.S. Amy can
expect co lace. The greatest air threat is in central
Europe where there is a capability of some 400£ enemy
aircraft. All of these aircraft are expected to exhibit a
number of improvements* increased radius of operation,
weapons load ircreases, high performance avionics, sensors
designed to improve night and all-weather ccmbat
cape Dili ties , rrore accurate weapons delivery systems and
better electronic warfare equipment. ['Ret. 5] Though all of
these aircraft are not expected to pose a direct threat to
SHOHAD, it is this type threat that the SHORAD battalion
must be prepared to engage and do so in an efficient and
effective manner. There are four basic air threat missions
to consider when designing an air defense system for the
division. These will be addressed in order of increasing
threat to the division.
1. Close Air Support
The threat envisioned two air battles occurring
within divisional airspace. The forward air battle would
consist primarily of helicopters attacking ground maneuver
forces. The second air battle would be waged in the
26

division rear area where fixed-wing close air support (CAS)
aircraft would attack critical assets. iRef. 6J The advent
of the larger rurrbErs cf Soviet Hind and Hip helicopters
with great firepower and anti-tank capability has changed
the complexion of the forces needed to protect the division
against the low-a It itude air threat. These heavily arred
helicopters bave assumed the primary role of supporting
ground forces in the main battle along the forward edge of




Another significant air threat the division trust
combat is reconnaissance missions. These aircraft can be
either remotely piloted vehicles (HFV) or manned fixed-wing
aircraft and are usually characterized by using lew altitude
and high speeds to gather intelligence. The RPV ray be used
for gathering near-real time identification and location
information to support artillery and/or CAS missions and
presents a serious threat to the division because of its
small size and ability to penetrate "high risa" areas that
ray be considered well defended. [Ref. 7]
3. Interdiction
The last category of air threat posed directly at
the division and echelons above division is interdiction.
This mission is aimed against ground forces and logistics
from the division rear to the rear cf the army groups. This
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mission is typically carried out by manned fighter bombers
that rray have the capability of icv,-level penetration to
attach rear area targets.
4. Cffensive Counter Air
Offensive counter air missions are directed at
airfields, logistics facilities supporting air operations
and airspace surveillance ana direction systems. [Bef. 8]
Since rrost airfields in the corps and livision rear do not
contribute directly to tbe air superiority role, tne targets
for enerry cffensive counter air will be well to the rear cf
the division. Therefore, enerry aircraft assignee the
mission of cffensive counter air may cverfly cne cr mere
divisions at low altitude enroute to rear area targets.
B. SECBAE-C2 TCDAY
This thesis will focus on the information flow required
to maximize air defense effectiveness once deployed and not
dwell on the C2 aspects of air defense en-picyment/mianeuver
and the associated tactics.
1. U.S. Air Force Ccntrcl
The SBCRAD systems within the division do not
operate autoncrrously . Tbere is a definitive command and
operational control line under which ail air defense
artillery (ADA) units operate. This line begins with the
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Figure 7: Organization For Theater Air Battle Management
The area air defense corrmander , normally the Air
force component ccrrrrander, divides the theater into regions
for air defense purposes. The region air defense commander,
normally the tactical air force commander, is responsible
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for, ana has full authority in, the air defense of his
region. He noriraliy delegates authority for empioyrrent of
organic Army air defense means to the commanders cf the
major Arrry elements (ie. divisions) within his region. He
will normally delegate tc the commanders of the major Army
sutdivisions of bis region the authority to move Army ADA
units in direct support of aruy forces. The region
commander issues air defense rules of engagement, air
defense warnings and weapons control status (see Table II),
tut this is normally the only theater level control over the
firing of SECRAE weapons. [let. 9: pp. t-2 , £-2]
2 . Centralized Control/recent rali zed Execution
SH0PAI-C2 procedures are characterized ty
centralized control and decentralized execution. Air
defense alerting and controlling information is developed by
the Air Yorce for each region and locally within each
division at headquarters that are adequately staffed to
collect, process, evaluate and disseminate relevant air
defense intelligence information. Conversely, SHCRAD
weapons are rracned and fired ty squads/teams which are
separated from ail other members cf the same defense.
Therefore, to be effective, the firing decision must be made
at the weapon systems and authority to engage must be
delegated tc the firing team commanders.
Decentralized execution of division air defense by
small remote teams poses a tremendous challenge to the
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SHORAD battalion commander who exercises command ever all
ADA units organic, assigned or attached to the division. To
meet the C2 need, several ccntrcl procedures exist within
ADA units to preclude SHOEAD engagement or friendly
aircraft. These control procedures consist of rules of
engagement , weapons control status and air defense warnings
(see Table II). Procedures are not necessarily standard in
divisions throughout the Arrry.
TAPLE II
CCNTRCL PROCEDURES
c RULES CE ENGAGEMENT
* Hostile Criteria
- Attacking friendly forces or assets
- Markings/configurations of enemy a/C
* Weapons Control Status
o WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS
* Weapons Eree - fire at any A/C not positively
identified as friendly
* Weapons Tight - fire only at A/C positively
identified as hostile according
to hostile criteria
* Weapons Hold - fire in self-defense only
c AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS
* Red - Attach is eminent or in progress
* Yellow - Attack is probable
~ White - Attecx not probable
[Ref. b': pp. £-6, 5-11]
2. Disserrinat ion of Ccntrcl Procedures/Earl v Warning
High tc medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems
in or near the division area operate with an electrcric
command and control system, AN/TSC-72 Missile Minder, that
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has data link comrrunications with the Air lores regional
control system, enabling the exchange or aircraft tracK
information and direct air defense control procedures.
Since IHAWK is expected to be employed either in direct
support (DS) or general support (GS) of the division, this
information can be disseminated to pertinent users ty
establishing a linfc between the HIKAD (I5AWK) unit and the
SHOHAD battalion TCC . If no HIMAD systems are in or near
the division the linK must be to the Air Yorce forward air
control pest (IACP), control and reporting center (CEC) cr
control and reporting post (CBF). The lin* to the region
air defense ccn-marder is critical and must be established
either directly or indirectly to pass air defense Cir
information .
a. Air Defense Coordination Net (ABCN)
Change two to the "ADA Employment,
Chaparral/Vulcan" field manual added an appendix to provide
Army wide standardization and to definitively explain the
procedures and resources required to establish the lini
mentioned above. It describes (as shown at Figure 6) The
air defense coordination net (ADCN) by which the air defer.se
coordination section (ADCS) disseminate both tracK data and
control information to the SHCHAL TCC.
The air defense coordination officer (AECO) has
an AN/GBC-106 Al" radio for the long range corrrrunica tion





figure 8. Air Defense Coordination Net
continuous operations. The control procedure information is
sent to the SHCEAE TCC only when there is a change in
status, while track positions are transmitted as the track
data becomes available. The AECC obtains EIFAE track
information by physically viewing the radar console. He may
initiate the report from inside the source van if he is
equipped with a remote unit. If not, he must call via land
line to the driver/RTO v/hc transmits the report on the
radio .
For track reports, the location (using a SECPAD
grid system} and raid size must always be sent while
heading, identification and aircraft type need only be sent
when time permits. (see Table III) Update information is
not reported until the track moves into another 10 kilometer
grid designator, at which time it is rebroadcast in total.
(Some of the obvious flaws in this system will be discussed






location .... Orange (10 km grid designator)
Raid Size . . . .Cne, Few (2-4), Many
CFTIONAL
IE Unknown, Hostile
Heading Southwest, North, etc.
Type Jet, Helo, Prop.
[Bef. 9: p. 1-6]
t. lariy Warning Eroadcast Net (EWEN)
At the SHCRAL TCC personnel receive the AICC's
reports on their AN/GRC-106A radio and:
o record the tracKs
.
d determine if the track requires retransmission,
o transmit appropriate early warning over the early
warning eroadcast net (ZY/EN).
o transmit air defense warnings over the EVBN and
transmit other air defense C2 information over
the tattalicn command net.
The early warning broadcast net (EWBN) provides long-range
early warning and control procedure information to any unit
with an I« receiver and within line of sight (LOS) and
operating range of the SHORAD TCC. FAAR operators are
required to monitor the EVEN oy using the AN/VRC-4G radio
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normally used, for their platoon corrrrand net. The operator
then voice-tells the information received from the SHCRAC
TOC in addition to sending those tracks detected fcy his own
radar systerr either by voice or BJ'EL. (see Jigure y)
This relay of EfoEN information can potentially
double the range and multiply the coverage by eight (number
of FAAEs) over that that the one originating transmitter
had. It also provides for better coverage of dead spots,
since the F1AH are normally positioned or higher ground,
while the TCC would be in a mere secure and lower position
whicn offers poor ICS coverage. (igain, the weaknesses in
this system will be addressed in section C la . )
Cne-Way Eroadcast
Two-Way Net
RIIL/Fr: Track Data (one-way)
figure 9: Early Warning Eroadcast Net
4£

4. Division Airspace Management Element (SAME )
Having described the procedures and networks for
getting C2 information relayed from the regional air defense
corrmander to the fire unit, it is necessary to address one
final and key ncde Ln tbe SH0RAD-C2 system: the division.
The focal point for coordination of AC operations within the
division area occur at the division rrain TOC (DTOC) and the
tactical corrmand post (TAC CP). The division airspace
management element (DAME) is an integral part of the DTOC
and consists of SHORAE and army aviation personnel. (An ATA
elerrent in the TAC CP performs similar functions.) The DAME
to SHOHAI TCC linK has several potential rreans of
communications :
c Multi-channel (installed ty the signal bn . )
o AM/SSB operations & intelligence (TJATT)
o EM command net >SHCRAD bn . )
o Land Line (if feasible)
r.aintaining communications between the DAME and the SKORAD
TOC is crucial since the Air Force liescn officer (ALO),
located in the DTOC, provides a second means of obtaining or
verifying current control procedure information.
The DAM has better access tc the rraneuver brigades
and the air defense liason officers (LNOs) in each brigade
TOC. The DAME, therefore, is able tc maintain a good
"picture" of what is rccuring both on the ground and in the
air. DAME corrmunications with the brigade LNOs completes
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the loop (see Figure lz) since the Chaparral 'Vulcan
betteries coordinate with the appropriate brigade thru the
LNO. (If there is no cattery operating in a particular
brigade area the LNO would be in direct contact with the
SHORAD battalion.) The coordination with the LNO typically
utilizes JIM radios, however, land line rray be installed
depending upon the situation.
FM CMD NETS
Multi-Channel
Figure 10: AD Communications within the Division
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' C. SE0RAI-C2 IEFICIENCIES
1 . Early Warning/Control Procedures
REICRGEB after action reports since lb>?£ have
continually stated that current early warning systems do act
rreet Army requirements. Some of the arguememts against ard
weaknesses of the system in the field tcday are serious.
a. One-way Corrrrunication
Given that the EWEN is a one-way network, as <=> re
track data transmissions from the FAAR to fire units, it is
a certainty that some voice traffic will not be received by
the FAAB operators and relayed. Also, some traffic either
direct cr relayed will not be received by the fire units for
one of several reasons. Even with an cptiristic assumption
that 100% of the track data reacfces all lib fire units, the
data is so 'old" that it is virtually useless.
b. No Cueing
Early warning as described thus far has amounted
to alerting only. Alerting is the portion of early warning
where the user is warned that an aircraft is in the area of
interest whicn requires cnly gross positional data. Cueing,
on the other hand, is the process cr providing information
to the fire units which tells him where to lccit for a target
and provides hirr with tentative identification of that
target. The Air Defense Center at Ft. Bliss, Ti. uses the
criterion that cueing must be accurate to within plus or
rrinus ten degrees of the true azirruth to the target and to
4fc

within three seconds of the target's detected iocaticn.
Neither FAAR-TADDS nor the MSCS systerr provide cueing to
SHORAD fire units.
c. i'AAR-TADDS Shortcomings
At tne heart of SHORAD early warning is the
iAAE-TAEES system which has been plagued with operational
and maintenance problems since first fielding over a decade
age. Seme identified problem areas with the radar are:
o Manual target extraction,
o Vehicle turrcvers.
o High failure rate of some parts,
o low capability in an ECM environment.
o Lack of radar range coverage.
(1) No Network of Sensors,. An apparent
deficiency is the lack of a netverfc, such that a fire unit
is dependant on one source of early warning. Tnis compounds
the squad/team leader's problem should the FAAB from which
he is receiving track data become non-operational due to
equipment failure, being directed tc move or not move tc
Keep up with the movement of the fire unit.
(2) Mobility/Perl cyitent Restrictions.
Deployment guidelines for 5AAR-TADDS take into consideration
tne system's capabilities and limitations. These include
deploying £AAR re closer than two kilometers from the FEBA
for security reasons. Ideally the FAAR should be positioned
nc more than nine kilometers apart to maintain continuous
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racier coverage should, one system oeccire non-operational or
be directed tc rrove. To provide "adequate" alerting to the
fire units, radar coverage should extend at least ten
Kilometers Deyond the supported units. These guidelines
would force the FAAR to either prepare to rove, move or
prepare for erplacerent nearly as often as it would be in
position and operational for any dynaric type situation in
support of maneuver forces. Missions of this type can be
eirected to occur 50% of the time as was shown at Table I of
chapter I. It's during just such a dynamic scenario that
"good" early warning is needed the most. A system that is
operational only 5e-75% of the time is unacceptable tc the
fire units in question.
A very experienced squad/team leader may he
able tc keep up with the n-eny radar status changes were he
sitting in a static defensive posture. However, the same
dynamic situation that might cause the 5AAH tc meve
frequently will rrost certainly force rany more moves on the
weapon systems. For the TAIIS tc display usable target
information at the fire unit, the following requirements
must be met:
o the squad/tearr leader rust Know the location
of the IAAB fror whicn he is receiving data,




c the TAEDS rrnst De set en the same FM frequency
and RIEL address coae as the associated FAAR
.
o the fire unit must be within 15 km of the FAAR.
o the fAAH/TAEDS trust maintain LOS. [Ref. 10]
Assuming the squad/teair leader has the
necessary information on at least three of the FAAR that
will oe operating nearest to his particular area of
operation, it is very lively that the required information
would have changed several times during the course of a day
and be invalid when needed. The FAAH location is needed
because the TAILS is oriented with the FAAR positioned in
the center. The tire unit is manually plotted on the TALES
t'j the squad/teair leader requiring a new plot with every
BAAB and/or fire unit move.
The potential for error in location, aadress
cede and orientation is great. fuch time and effort by
command personnel and over command nets has been spent
during exercises to try ana correct problems resulting from
operator errcr, misunderstandings and poor preparation.
Typically, the Stinger teams are the rost difficult to
contact and are often not informed of FAAR moves. Often
dissatisfaction with the FAAR-TADDS system results in
squads/teams depending solely en visual acquisition by one




a. Long Range Track Lata
The problems mentioned above led to widespread
development cf varying types of early warning and manual
plotting systerrs. In January 1^2'c a change to FF 44-2 was
published tc standardize a manual SHORAD control system
(MSCS) consisting of the AECN and FWEN which were were
described earlier. The intent was net so much to do away
with FAAR-1AELS deficiencies (though a grid system was
introduced to allow for manual passing of tracK: data) tut,
to add long-range tracK data to the system.
There are, however, as many if not more problems
with the long-range trac* data system. The AECO initiating
the report is either looking over someone's shoulder at a
EIFAD scope cr looking at a manual plotting board. Ee then
converts, using a board with two overlays, from GIORIF to
the SHORAE grid. he then may have to relay the report to
his RTC who transmits it tc the SHCRAD TOC . Processing at
the TOC may determine that it needs tc be broadcast over the
IWEN . For those fire units not within FP reception of the
SHCRAD TOC, a relay by the FAAR operator finally gets the
trectf data tc the fire unit. As rrany as five
retransmissions for a single track report!
In addition to the delay associated with
numerous retransmission, there is the problem of confusion.
The ADCO, who is looking over a console in tbe battery
control center (BCC) van, is typically in tbe way of IHAWK

operations and, therefore, the first to te forced out vher
the situation gets intense. Eis reporting process (land-
line or rerrcte unit) becomes distracting to the IHAWK
mission.
At the SHCRAD TOC the confusion level increases
as IAAB ana ADCC reports flood the system. The manual
plotting and rebrcadcasting functions can easily become
vntiorkable with moderate tc heavy air traffic. (There are
eight receivers from FAAH and one frorr the ADCC "squawking"
reports . )
foith no feedDacic loop frcrr the fire units to the
Z'4'PN , tnere is no means for managing the system problems.
The confusion en tne part of the fire units during periods
of neavy air attack will only be increased by the receipt of
excited and confusing reports over the EVEN. The manual
SHCRAD control system (MSCS) is unworkable.
Z. Airs-oace Management
Eespite an obvious neea for en airspace management
system forwarc of the division rear, there is no common
system in the Army today. iM 1-60, Airspace Management and
Arrry Air Traffic in a Comtat Zone, frovia.es Army doctrine
for airspace control and airspace management, but this field
manual has vague requirements that lack the methodology and
division structure necessary for implementation. Eor these
end other reasons, airspace management is in need of a more
refined definition, a process that is orceins.
C7

Air defense artillery is a Key information source to
airspace management and at the saire titre dependant upon
ether inputs, particularly the Army aviation. The link
between these two important airspace users is a critical one
performed by the EAME in the DTOC . Without further
refinement of the responsibilities for airspace management
•though needed and under study), there are several areas
where SBCRiD-CZ is lacKing in suppcrt of current airspace
maragemer i ,
To manage the division airspace properly, a near
real-time system for exchange, process and display of C2
information is reeded. That system does not exist today.
Without such c system it is extremely difficult to conduct
any semi-complex scenario involving several changes to
warning conditions, weapons control statuses, mission
definition, friendly/enemy electronic countemneasure
activity, sensor management or unit locations and status
effectively. Ixecutlcn of such a system requires a two-way
dialog because some information is reeded at the fire units
while other is needed at the SHCRAI TOC and the EAME. An
acknowledgement is normally desired as well. Eoth of these
factors contribute to an excessive amount of radio time on
command channels.
Typically, the timeliness of unit locations and
status at the DTOC will be in excess of one hour due to
retransmissions and other radio traffic requirements. In
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tne dynamic environment ci' the air battle, changes are
current for only seconds, possibly minutes, but not hours.
A delay of this sort does not Keep the BAI^F current on the
air defense "picture". Likewise, changes in weapon control
status, Fission assignments and new sensor locations can
take excessive amounts ci" time tc reach each fire unit.
Again, with 115 fire units there will always he seme that
will be operating v.ith old/invalid QZ information which will
render them useless or a tbreat tc friendly aircraft.
This lacK cf a near real time SECRAE-C2 system has
precluded effective use of the division airspace. At the
same time, the SH0EAE-C2 deficiencies have created a sti^a
in which both Air Force pilots and commanders perceive Army
air defense as a real threat. Fast experience has shewn
that when Air Force aircraft penetrate division airspace at
low altitudes, the region air defense commander has
restricted the weapons control status for an entire division
area or mere well in advance of that mission to afford the
maximum protecticL from Army air defense. This unfortunate
reality has decreased air defense effectiveness over a much
larger area and for a lcnger period of time than necessary.
I. THE NFFI
The areas described above indicate a need for an
improvement to current SH0RAL-C2. Several studies have been
conducted to determine the value of cueing and other C2
c f;

aspects of SEORAL. One such study by the Artry Materiel
Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) titled "Division Air
Lefense Command and Control" (EADC£) snowed that automation
using the AN/TSC-73 Missile Minder, an automated FAA3, a
transmission schene translator, and a hand-held terminal
display resulted in 1GU<% increase in aostile aircraft kills,
70^ decrease in dan-age to friendly assets and up to 580%
increase in air defense effectiveness.
With technology available today, automation of some of
the C2 functions can provide:
1. timely and accurate cueing data tc the fire team,
(elimination of rranual delay, errors and saturation)
2. improved system operation and survivability. (EMCCN,
radar blinking)
i. reduction in size and configuration to enhance
deployabi li ty/mobili ty . (nc reed for plotting boards
and plotters)
4. real-time dissemination and receipt of division air
battle irf orrret ion .
5. naximum firepower against enemy, while protecting
friendly aircraft.
6. operate effectively in a sophisticated electronic
warfare environment.
The gap between system capabilities today and the
requirements for a SHCRAE-C2 system necessitate development
cf an automated system. Though this fact is generally
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agreed upon cy the air defense coirirunity there is wide





The methodology used to conduct a comparative analysis
includes definition of the environment in which the new
command and control system will operate. That environment
consists of the division as it will be fielded in lb66 and
the SHORAT battalion in that timeframe. The operational
requirements for a SH0RAI-C2 systerr will be defined in terns
of constraints and criteria. This system definition wi;.l
act as a frameworK to be used as a comparative basis for the
two proposed systems: one by Sanders and one ty Litton.
A. THE IIVISICN IN 1966
There are five type divisions in the Army today. The
type divisions span a variety of missions and mobility
requirements tc enable the land forces to operate in nearly
all environmental ccrditions worldwide. Rather than address
all five types, the heavy division will serve as the basis
for further discussion. The choice of the heavy division
was motivated ty the number of heavy divisions currently in
the Army and ty available data on the Division £? structure
for the heavy division. The division structure, less air
defense, is described in brief at Appendix B.
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B. EIVISICN 66 AIR DEFENSE
1. Organization
The division in 1966, as described at Appendix B, is
rranned and equipped to the capacity (leered necessary and
acceptable by the Commanding General of the Training and
Doctrine Cotrprand (TEADOC). This proposed force structure
was subsequently approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Modifications have and probably will continue to be made to
that structure, cut the basic elements requiring air defense
prctecticn will remain intact. It will, therefore, pcse a
tremendous challenge to the division air defense officer to
provide protection from aerial attacK tc the many and varied
critical assets within the Tivision c6 structure.
The sheer number cf critical assets requiring air
defense coverage far outnumber the air defense resources.
This fact requires that the division commander specify
certain assets as priorities for air defense. Past
experience has shown that certain assets are normally
designated as priorities and they include: the maneuver
brigades, the DISCOM, the nuclear capable FA, the TTOC and
the division TACTICAL CP.
The maneuver brigades are well forward and in
contact with the ereuy which requires supporting air defense
units he toth as survivaole and rrocile as the units they are
supporting. The ether air defense priorities are generally
less mobile and are considered fixed assets. These facts

contributed tc the development of the division 86 air
defense organization ana will directly affect the design and
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figure 11. Division 66 Air Defense Battalion
As of January 1982, the SHCRAD-C2 office of the
Directorate of Combat Development (DCD) at Ft. Eliss, Tx
.
has stated that the heavy division will be equipped with 26
division air defense (DIVAD) guns, 16 improved Chaparrals
(ICHAP), and 75 Stinger (MANPADS) tears. (This has not
changed since the SHORAD Command and Control (C2)
Operational and Organizational (0 and 0) Concept of 22
November 1982 was prepared.) The organization depicted at
Eigure 11 provides each maneuver brigade with a
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DIVAD/PANFADS battery and an ICHAP battery and Stinger
battery for rear area fixed asset defense. This
organization was developed to support the concept that the
SHCRAD battalion would be engaged in two air battles: one,
primarily helicopter, forward and over the iraneuver forces?
the second, primarily fixed wing, over rear areas.
2. Weapon Systerrs
The Division 86 SHOEAD battalion will realize the
firepower increase, rrobility, survivability, and accuracy of
the DIVAD gun. The DIVAD will replace the vulcan (in the
heavy division) and will join the improved Chaparral and
Stinger systerrs in a new and larger SHCRAD battalion.
Because of the size and weight of the tanif chassis on which
the gun is mounted, the airborne and airrrobile divisions
will not be equipped with the DIVAD cut, will keep the towed
vulcan until a light air defense systerr (LADS) is fielded to
provide the flexibility of air-transportability cy both
fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
C. SH0EAD-C2 CFSRATICNAI REQUIREMENTS
Having described the deficiencies and problem areas in
the current SHCRAD-C2 systerr (Chapter II), one's
appreciation for the need for a "better" near-real tirre
system leads to the development of operational requirements.
The "user", U.S. Army Air Defense School (USAADS) at Ft.
Bliss, Tx
.
, formalized their requirements in a June 1952
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'Draft LOA (letter of agreement) for a Short-Range Air
Defense Command ana Control (SH0BAD-C2) System". The letter
was sent tc the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) for approval. The requirements in that letter were
delineated as follows:
"(1) The SKCRAD-C2 system will provide an automated
assist in accomplishment of the following functions:
(a) Alerting tc SHORAD and supported forces cf
pending air attack.,.
(b) Rapid dissemination and acknowledge of the
receipt cf selected items cf Air Defense Artillery
weapons control information.
(c) Cueing of SHCRAD fire units to aircraft in their
vicinity. .
.
{2) The SHCRAE system must provide for simple system
interface, remote operation of components, mobility and
survivability commensurate with supported systems,
modular system design, post-development software
considerations, use of existing power and communications
equipment, safe operations ard a multi-modal sensor
system." [F.ef. 1: pp. 1,2]
These requirements, with amplification and specific
constraints and criteria, will act as the cornerstone en
which a "baseline" system will be designed for use in the
evaluation effort.
Designated a major project, the SECRAE-C2 system is
being formally defined in a request for proposal (P.IP) that
has not yet been completed by the project managers office.
The requirements used in this analysis, were developed from
the letter of agreement discussed in Chapter II and from the
experience and knowledge cf SHCRAD and command and control
by the author. The system requirements are further refined
into constraints and criteria listed below.

1. Constraints
There are three basic requirement categories into
which each constraint rr.ay be placed: performance, fielding,
cr physical requirements. The constraints that follow are
grouped in tnis manner for continuity purposes.
a. Performance Requirements
o consolidate sensor mf crrrat ion and/or network
sensors together
o provide alerting to fire units
o proviie cueing to fire units
c provide air Battle "picture" and fire unit
status to the EA^I, Ede TOC, and SHCP.AD TOC
c provide command and control information
required by fire unit to engage aircraft
o provide capability to acknowledge receipt of
C2 information by fire unit
o integrate with the EIVAE sensor
o integrate with HIPAE sensor's)
b. Fielding Requirements
o te capable of worldwide operations
o be capable of fielding in 'S5-'86 timeframe
o be compatible with current VRC 12 series
radios and the new HI radios as well as The
associated secure equipment




o be equipped with light weight display at the
fire unit
o have a display that is pcwered by standard
batteries/power source
o have an easy to operate display
o have highly mobile sensors
o. be as survivable as supported units
o te transportable ty read, rail, sea and air.
2. Criteria
Each coDstraint above will have one or rore criteria
to provide clarification . Justification fcr the criteria is
provided in Appendix A.
a. Performance Requirements
o A fire unit cannot ce dependent i.pon only one
sensor. Zach fire unit rust bave a
consolidated "picture" of local cirspace from
two or more sensors .
c The fire unit must be provided with at least
a IE km alerting radius,
c Cueing to the fire unit must be within +/- 10
degree accuracy and 2 second timeliness,
c The air-battle "picture" on TOC displays must
include fire unit status, record of previous




c The following information by the system tc
each fire unit to allow aircraft engagement:
priirary target sector/line, air defense
warning, state of alert, weapon control
status and tentative identification of
tracks
.
o The systerr must provide a means to
acknowledge receipt of control procedure
information by the fire unit.
o Target track ana ccmrand data must be
compatible with the DIVAD system tc allcw
exchange of data to the DIVAD and from it to
the SH0RAD-C2 system.
o long-range track data must be integrated into
the SH0RAD-C2 system for alerting,
b. Yielding Requirements
o The SE0RAD-C2 system must meet environmental
and operational testing requirements for
worldwide use. Degradation of system
capabilities must be consistent with ether
tactical data systems deployed in the same
locale
o The system can be fielded by '85-'8e
timeframe
.
o The system either is or is not compatible




c The SHORAL-C2 system must be able tc perform
its mission with an equal degree of success
Id four of the five type divisions. It must
be able to operate in all five, allowing one
division type to be less "successful",
c. Physical Requirements
c The fire unit display cannot exceed 10 pounds
nor be larger than a standard briefcase
(including batteries and/or cabling to pcver
source ) .
o Displays at the fire unit must be either
powered by standard Army batteries or provide
slaving system off weapon or vehicle system.
c The display must be weapon centered and
posses an easily learned (by fire unit
personnel) man-machine interface.
o The sensor rust be as n"Obile as the supported
units (traces/wheels).
o The sensor must be as survivable as the fir
defense assets it is supporting. System
components et the TCCs/fire units must be as
survivable as that TCC/fire unit
respectively .





Sanders and Iitton are no strangers to the problems and
requirements of Army Air Defense. Each corrpany nas been
involved with SHCRAD and-/ or other aspects of air defense for
sorre time.
Sanders designed and developed the FAAR that was
deployed in 1972. Since that tirre they have demonstrated to
both the U.S. ana Isreai certain improvements and
roaif icatior.s tc the Dasic iAAR/TADDS. In lb?£, Isreai
bought the low altitude aircraft detection system (LAADS)
and in 1980 they purchased the improved LAADS from Sanders.
IRef. 11]
Litton Lata Systems integrated operational system
software for the AK/TSQ-73, Missile Kinder, and the tactical
fire direction system (TACilBE). Tne AN/TSQ-73 is an air
defense command ana control center for integration of manned
interceptor control and surface-tc-air missile fire
distribution. TACFIRI automates critical field artillery
functions.
The Marine Corps contracted Litton to develop a tactical
air operations central iy£5 (TACC-65) which is a command and
control system capable of coordinating an array of air
aeiense weapons. Litton also completed a study defining
miner changes required to adopt the TAOC-et to the Air
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Force. [Her. 12: p. lj Additionally, Litton has developed
a family of intelligent terminals which transmit data
digitally and display it graphically or alpnanumerically .
A. SANDIBS PRCFCSAI
1 . Overview
Sanders has not designed a complete package or
system to meet all or the SHCBAE-C2 requirements. The
official requirements document has not been released and
rather than guess at the requirements Sanders opted tc
continue the desigr and improvement upon a system they
already had, the FAAF./TADES.
The systerr description tnat follows is based on
demonstrated and proclaimed' capabilities. Tne proclaimed
capabilities range from those conducted in hcuse oy Sanders
to a theoretical possibility based on current hardware with
minimal software changes.
Some of the corponents to the C2 system have been
proposed by Sanders personnel, MCOP. personnel, and air
defense personnel from the air defense center at Ft. Bliss,
Tx. and in the high technology test ced (HTTB), however, the
totel systerr together has been developed by the author.
Though the SHCRAD-C2 system needs to be considered as a
whole, it will be described in two parts: those areas
external to the SHORAE battalion and those within the





Jigure 12. Sanders SEORAD-Ck: System Design
t . Internal
Sanders has concentrated their efforts in the area
of local early warning through the use of the FAAB and
subsequently have developed a system that is primarily
internal to the SHORAD oattalion. They set out to correct
the deficiencies (discussed in chapter II) of the basic
FAAR/TAEBS system by modifications and improvements
ey

(described teicw) as well as developing new equipment to
rreet certain air defense requirements net addressed by the
improved FAAR/TADDS (IFAAfl/ITADDS)
.
a. Med A iAAR
Sanders developed a Mod A 1'AAE with the
following cesi^c approach:
c upgrade stardard iAAB with modification lei t tc
automate date processing lunction tc eliminate errors
and time delays resulting from operator saturation,
o data linK rressage to define target position in true
map coordinates (UTM)
o provide for netting radar data.
The above approach resulted in adding an automatic radar
information prccessor (RIP) and a data management unit (EMU)
to the basic FAAR. The control indicator was modified to
accept the PIP and EMU and tc provide a full alphanumeric
capability. Mere radio receivers (R-442) were required and
added to complete the Med A. [Ref. 11]
The EfU provides the capability to receive data
from two remote sources, combine these data with the local
sensor data, and then retransmit e corrbined radar picture.
This combining capability allows radars to be linked
together in a daisy-chain fashion (see Figure 13). The
chain provides gradual degradation as the elimination of one
raiar requires only tuning one R-442 receiver to the next
closest radar. It also means that fire units ( FU ) receive
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combined coverage to fill in terrain or electronic counter
measures (ECf) gaps ct the local raaar. Tne combined
coverage also prcvid.es an extended range and thus a longer
warning tire for sore aircraft (aejending on flight path).
Mgure 12. Daisy Crain NetworK of Med A lAARs
b. hca s iAAR
The second, rroaif ication to the i'AAR was based on
a design approach to:
c replace the criminal range gated doppler receiver with
new ligital signal processor
o provide radio frequency (RF) filter selection to
change Ri and eliminate manual filter substitution.
This was accomplished by replacing the radar receiver in the
Med A by a new digital receiver which resulted in the Mod B.
The Moa B has a 30/60 km selectable feature ana
provides hovering helicopter detection/classification. Its
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increased signal to noise ratio improves its ECO capability
along with the variable low velocity cutoff for road
traffic, rain, ar.a/or chaff rejection. [3ef. 11]
c. Improved Target Alerticp Data Display Set
The design approach to correcting TAEES
deficiencies included:
c providing a weapon-centered display
o using IJAAR data linK message
c provide alerting for potential targets
o prcviae cueing accuracy to targets within weapon
system range
o retain the high dollar iterrs of the basic TAEDS
.
Four of these approaches were ret ty replacing sorre internal
circuit cards to handle the new cata format and by replacing
the front panel. [Ref. 11]
Coordinate switches on the' panel pern-it the user
to input his location which provide the reference required
for a weapon centered display. Aierting is accomplished as
it was with the standard *AAR/TAEES. The cueing function,
however, is not satisfied, dispite an atterrpt to reprogram
the display drives. The display was programed such that the
tracKs in ranges of 1.5 to 7.5 kit of the weapon system were
displayed with mere accuracy in the 16 boxes inside the
circle (2x3 km=b sq Km/ box) while the boxes outside the





Figure 14 also depicts tne arrbiguity protlerc
with the ITADES and the inability to cue the fire unit. The
large circle encorrpasses the desired cueing area and the
radial lires delineate 30 degree sectors. Each of the 48
boxes (exclude center box) contains two flippers: one is
orange tc indicate unknown aircraft, the second is green to
indicate friendly aircraft. The arcciguity occurs when a
flipper in a bcx that straddles twc sectors is signaled.
- indicate friendly/unknown flippers
Figure 14. ITAIDS Eisplay
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Instead cf indicating a 30 degree sector, this indication
alerts the fire unit to a tracK that could be anywhere
within a 6£ degree window. Therefore, cueing to less than
60 degrees is not possible with the current display,
a. Integrated Weapons Display (IWL)
To utilize the accuracy of the IFAAH and to
overcoire tne cueing deficiency of the ITADDS, Sanders
developed an IVD. The IWE utilizes a processor to integrate
radar target data with forward looKing infrared (5LIH) data
on a common weapon centered night Chaparral display. "Both
radar syrrools and FUR iirages on the display rrove with tne
turret as it slews in azimuth while the gunner's ooresisht
regains centered on the display. The symbols provide target
location, tentative identification, speed, direction, and
classification (rotary or fixed wing). Filtering of target
information is provided to display only targets which are
en^ageafcle or threatening (based on aircraft profiles) to
the weapon systerr. Additionally, the IWD presents air
defense warnings and weapon control status on the display.
[Ref. 11]
Though this system proved extrerely accurate and
allowed gunners in the may 1962 Golden Blade exercise to get
rrissile tone or the correct target without ever looking
outside the turret, there are two prchlerrs that need to be
addressed. First, the IWE is practical on turret mounted
systems such as Chaparral, Vulcan, and DIVAD, but not for
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the Stinger (MANFADS). Second, is the doctrinal problem
which requires the fire command to be given oy the fire unit
leader acd not the gunner.
3. External
The areas consiiered external to the battalion
include Hir-AD or Air Force centers, the CAPE, ana brigade
LNCs. This portion of the Sanaers systerr has received the
lesser aircunt of attention. However, a modification to the
current systerr that has oeen proposed includes the use of an
integrated weapons display (IWD) with a larger (1£ inch)
piastre display or a cathode ray tube (CRT) display for use
in the LAP'S, SHOF.AD TOC, and brigade TOCs. The display is
capable of depicting SEOflAI units as well as current air
traffic. This capability (with CHT) was demonstrated in the
f^ay iyfc2 Gclder Elade exercise, and provides management and
liason personnel with a reai-tirre "picture" of the airspace
while providing a less responsive view of the SHORAD
coverage. (Fire unit locations are updated manually.)
There is currently no means for passing data
automatically between HITAI or Air Force and the SHORAD
system. That exchange, utiiizirg the air defense
coordination section (ADCS) at the HII^AD unit, will continue
to be alerting only by voice tell. An IWD with large screen
can be provided to the ADCS for information only, since no






like Sanders, Litton did not atterrpt to design or
develop a total SH0RAI-C2 system. Their approach was to
concentrate on data processing and displays while utilizing
available sensor data from either FAAR, IF.AWK and/or
AN/TSC-73. As shown at figure 15, the system description
will be given in twc portions, internal and external to the
SBCPAI battalion.




Two pieces of additional equipment comprise the
hardware needed within the SHORAD battalion to provide tooth
early warning and comrand and control to the fire units.
These additions negate the need for the TADDS or the
improved TADDS.
a. digital Communications Terrrinal (DCT)
The DCT is a hand held "smart" terrrinal with
alj banumeric and graphics capability which allows the
display of rraps, air ccrridcrs and prohibited areas, as well
as, control procedure inf orrration . This secure, high speed
twc-way communication device interfaces with all standard
military radios and secure equipment. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
Its first air defense application was for the
Marine Corps in 1977 as en interactive display terrrinal
(IDT). Subsequently, it underwent development for the Arry
to corrply with the Missile Interirr Specification Standards
for SHORAE Tata link (MIS 345&5A). [Ref. 13]
The DCT provides a weapon centered display of
the air picture within selectable ranges of 5, 10, or 2Z km
cf the fire unit. This feature provides for both alerting
ana cueing since high resolution is provided on close in
fast moving targets while a lesser amount cf resolution
alerts operators to slower moving and/or distant targets
(see Figure 16). Two resolutions, and therefore update
rates, were incorporated to allow message traffic to be sent
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t'rorr the tire unit while the slower data rate is in use









Figure 16. Resolution Adapted tc Threat Situation
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b. Briefcase Terrrinal (ECT)
The briefcase terminal is a ligntweight,
portable, intelligent ccmmuni cat ions ana display terminal
that was designed to help commanders coordinate troop
actions quicKly and efficiently. It is capacle of
simultaneous ccnrrunication over six separate radio or wire
nets and presents commanders with a 12x4 1/2 incn
interactive alphanumeric and graphic display. Additionally,
there are three input/output ports that may be connected to
ancillary devices such as a digitizer, Keyboard, printer,
and/'or irass storage devices. [Sef. 12: p. 15]
The ECT is required to perform the integration
of sensor data prior to transmission to the tire unit LCTs.
As srown at figure 15, BCTs would be located at several Key
command and control centers throughout the air defense
battalion. Sc^e of these centers would recuire a digitizer
(ie. data teolet) to permit manual input of graphics for a
variety of reasons .
IX) SfiCRAE TOC . The air defense operations
officer at the SHCRAD TOC would use the ECT to integrate
sources of trac£ and control procedure data that is external
to the battalion prior to down-lin&ing appropriate data to
other ECTs and/or DCTs throughout the division. It would
also upline the organic sensor UAAR) data and fire unit
status to interested command centers. The BCT at the SHOHAD
TOC would be equipped with a digitizer to allow graphical
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input to ail SHCRAD users. This TCC, with tbe BCT, would
provide the iinK between the internal and external users cf
air defense command and control information.
(2) Platoon Command Center (FCC). The PCC
requires a BCT to integrate local sensor (J;AAP) data with
the aown-iinked aata from cne SEORAD TOC . Tbe integrated
picture is then transmitted to ;.ocal fire units. The PCC
would uplink tbe local data to tbe SHORAD TOC to coirplete
the exchange of aata. The BCT et this center would not be
equipped with a digitizer as the plaxcon wculd ret initiate
messages requiring graphics.
'd. External
As depicted in figure i£, tne functions that are
external to the SHCRAD cattaiion are the division airspace
macagement element (DAME), the HIPAE or Air Icrce contrcl
center wit n in or closest to the division area, and the
supported brigade TOCs with air defense liascn officers
(INOs). Cne piece of additional equipment, described below,
is needed tc properly interface with the EIMAD equipment.
The briefcase terminal, however, rreets all of tbe other
integration needs .
a. Division Airspace Management Element (DAME)
The DAME must be equipped with a BCT tc monitor
the airspace situation and to transmit control procedure
information received from tbe Air Force iiason officer in
the DTOC. Though this may not be the primary method for

disseminating status changes, it provides an
alternate/ tacK-up . A digitizer wculd be required tc aiicw
EAPI personnel to dcwn-linK air corridors, restricted areas
and main supply routes to the SHOBAD TOC for further
dissemination.
B. fiish- to-Medium Altitude Air Defense (HIMAE)
There ere several potential sources of long
range tracK data, which include the IHAVK acquisition radar,
AN/TSC-73 and Air Force control ana reporting center (CRC)
radar. Since these systems do net produce the same message
format es tnat required ty either the RCT or DCT, Litton
developed the transmission scheme translator (TST). The TST
has demonstrated the ability to covert TADII-J3 format (used
by IHA^K. and AN/TS(;-73) into burst transmission format for
lown-linx. The original design objective was to allow for
conversion of ATDL-1 format as well, however, to date that
capability has net been demonstrated. [Ref. 14]
The conversion and transmission process create a
delay between serscr acquisition and user receipt. Alerting
can be accomplished, since the total transmission time for
HIPAE traces tc the SHOEAE fire unit is about ten seconds.
This delay, however, prevents the HIPAD sensor from cueing
SEORAE users .
The air defense coordination section (AECS),
equipped with a BCT, would provide direct access to the
SHCPAE-Ck: system with control procedure changes. In
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addition to providing long range tracx data tc SHOBAJ3 units,
the ADCS ccuia proviae SHOEAI sensor lata to HIKAE. No
means for conversion of Durst transmission to TAEIL-B for
automatic input to the AN/TSC-73 or cattery control center
of the IHAWI unit have been adaressed, but tne BCT display
could proviae tor a visual comparison with HI PAD displays,
c. Brigade Liascn Officer (INC)
The brigade INO, with a iCT ana digitizer, is
able to keep the brigade commander informed of the air-
battle as well as influence SECfiAD aeployment in support of
the land cattle. The memory capability in the BCT offers
the ability to aetermine nistoricai avenues of approach ana
attacK profiles. Special air operations and friendly close
air support car be protectea by adequate, yet not




The constraints ana associated criteria of chapter three
have been organized into three basic categories: fielding
requirements
,
physical requirements , and performance
requirements. Each category will be addressed In matrix
form witn detailed explanation following any system that is
unable tc meet any criteria of a given constraint or where




1 ! Operational System j Zero
2 j Modify Existing Capability J Slight
! (No New ieatures) !
2 ! Increase Capability (Add New, Moderate
! feature/Proven Principle) '
4 (Laboratory Tes ted(-Breadbcard) | Substantial
5
i
Theoretically Possible j Very High
!
(No Experimentation Lone) |
Any uncertainty or risk rating will be further qualified
by the use of risk levels found at Table IV. These levels
are designed to assist the reader in determining the degree






Constraints ! Senders i Iitton
Sensors netwcrKed' '
or processors ! YES i YES
consolidate data j i
Alerting provided! '
to tire units ,' YES ! YES
(l) Cueing provided
to fire units ! PAETIAL ! YES
(2) Air Dattle pict. ! i YES
to EACE, BDE TOC,! PAfiTIAI j (RISK)
and SHORAD TOC ! } (IVL-2)
(3) C2 required to ! j
engage A/C at NO | YES
the fire unit i '
(4) Acknowledge C2 ! !
receipt at F.U. j NO j YES
(5) Integrate with J YES j YES
DIVAE sensor i (RISK IVL-2) j (RISK LVI-3)
(6) Integrate wit n ! !
HIMD source j NC i YES
Note (): Numbers correspond tc explanations below.
1. Cue Eire Units
Sanders' proposal meets this requirement whenever
the integrated weapons display (IWE) is a part of the weapon
system. The Stinger systems, the majority of air defense
weapon systems in the division area, will not be cued.
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These systems go net have the IWE and rely solely upon the
ITAETS fcr early warning. Some fifty-eight percent of the
SHCBAD weapon systems woula not be cued.
2. Air Battle Picture
The Sanders proposal received a partial rating here
because of the nature of information provided to the various
command centers. This design offers only the current air
traffic, requiring continuous monitoring to retain any
historical data concerning trends, avenues of approach,
and/cr enemy target priorities. There is nc capability for
storing track data en an hourly, daily, or weekly basis.
There is alsc no means to determine which fire units are
operational at any one time, nor is ihere a capability to
receive leng-range track data from EIMAL or Air Force
sources. The air battle picture offered to tbe DAPE, SHOEAD
TOC, and Brigade TOCs is, therefore, only the real-time air
traffic provided by I?AAR and none of the specified elements
cf this criterion.
Though Litton's proposal does theoretically provide
all of the required capabilities in this area, it is
important to remember that all of tnese features have not
been demonstrated ana/or tested. It is a fairly simple task
to provide some of these features, warranting a ris& level
of two, but it takes more time to test and evaluate during




Corrn e dq and Control at Mre Unit
Tiie current voice-tell systeir, over the command net,
is the only way to transmit all cf the required procedural
aata to tte fire units under the Sanders design. There is
no message transmission capability. Once received by the
fire unit, some of the key procedural control words can te
manually irserted so as to be displayed on the IWE for ready
reference ty the gunner. Again, this capability exists only
with system equipped with the IWE.
4. Acknowledge Receipt
Similarly, there is no acknowledge capability beyond
the current system today. It is a very tirre consuming
procedure to pass ail cf the required command and control
information needed to engage aircraft to all fire units and
an even ionger ordeal to insure 1KZ% receipt via an
acknowledge report. V/ere receipt and acknowledge of control
procedure changes the only task cf a fire unit, the total
time to complete the loop may be acceptable, however, the
reality is that there are many activities going on
simultaneously that compete for the command net as well as
the fire unit member's attention.
5. Integrate »ith DIVAD System
Neither proposal has demonstrated the capability to
integrate with the DIVAE display. Eoth systems are able to
receive tracK data from the EIVAE sensor and pass it on to
interested fire units, however, the reverse is not a current
fee

capability. Ecth systems would rate a level three risK here
as the striding of compatible data tc the DIVAD display rray
differ substantially from receiving it. Since the DIVAD is
still in the development phase, the capability should be
incorporated to allow transfer of target data in both
directions with which ever SE0RAI-C2 system is selected.
S- Integrate with EIMAD
Sanders has dene little towards integration with
elements outside of the SBORAT battalion. The voice-tell
procedure cy liason personnel at the HIMAD source world
continue tc be the means for long-range alerting. Litton,
on the ctiaer hand, has developed and tested the transmission




Constraints Sanders ! litton
C a p a 1 1 e of world
wide operations YES YES






and HI radios !
YES YES
(2) Compatible w/ all
|
j
division types | NO j YES
Note (): Numbers correspond tc explanations teicw
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1. Held Systeir By lb&t-l^&e Timeframe
.. The risk rating tor Litton is tasea on tne lack of
testing en the briefcase terminal (ECT). It would rate a
risk level of three. Cnly the digital corrrunication
terminal (TCT) and the transmission scheme translator (TST)
have teer military specification and operationally tested by
ccth the f:arlr.es (in an air defer.se application) and the
Army (in a field artillery use). The ECT was not pursued ty
the farine Corps and never tested for specification
compliance or for operational capability. This piece of
equipment, therefore, n aj delay tne fielding process to
complete testing. Though the adaptation of the ECT to meet
all of the requirements may seerr well within hand, it is
important to note that the SHCFAI-C2 system proposed ty
litton currently has rore instruction lines in its software
than dees the AN/TSQ-7,2, Missile finder, system that
supports HlfAD today.
2. Corrrcjat loillty V ; ith Type Divisions
Saraers proposal has a shortcoming with this
constraint. The display is too heavy (15 its.) for the
light (straight leg) infantry and airborne soldiers to
carry. It rray be true that many operations utilizing the
light infantry will allow for vehicles for the Stinger teams
and towed vuican sections, however, Stinger team deployment
for these type divisions dees not guarantee the use of
vehicles. Additionally, should an airmobile or airassault
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operation take place, the 5AAH would be left behind for
insertion at scrre later time. This situation would leave
the fire units with only the current system of slow voice-







Constraint i Sanders ! Litton
Lightweight j
disjiay at the i NC YES
fire units ' !
Display powered i
by standard sys.! TES ! YES
Easy to operate | '
display | YES j YES
Mobile sensor | YES | NO
Survivable as { |
supported units i YES i NO
Transportable by! !
road, rail, sea,| YES YES
and air
Note (): Numbers correspond xc explanations below.
1 . Lightweight Display
The improved TADDS is, by size and weight standards,
the same as the basic TALES. Its fifteen pounds makes it
extremely unlikely that it will be carried into battle in a
dismounted configuration. The weight also would preclude
6b

either the section/team leader or the gunner frorr carrying
it with him during routine duties around the fire unit
position. The TADDS today is typically set up at an
observation post location upon arrival at a new fire unit
site, but left unattended for varying lengths of time during
the course of the site occupation. The section/ team leader
norrally has several duties to acconplish during set-up and




The current configuration of FAAH, rrcunteci on a gama
,?oat, has prcven unsatisfactory for reasons previously
discussed. Sanders has developed a new IFAAB to he mounted
en a M577 arrrcred vehicle which would afford a greater
degree of both mobility and survivability on the
battlefield. The IAADS that was sold to Isreal is mounted
on a 2 1/2 ton cargo trucJK and offers greater mobility with
a lower probability of vehicle turn-ever. (There have been
thirty-two vehicle turn-overs with the garra goat mounted
FAAE.
)
There are advantages and disadvantages to either
alternative that need not be addressed here. The fact
remains that with respect to the requirement for a mobile
sensor, Sanders has addressed the problem and developed both
a wheeled and a tracked version for use with appropriate
division types. Litton, however, has been content to
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utilize whatever sensor is available. Tiie basic JAAP , with
its iiPii tations/vuinerabili ties , is the current sensor.
2. Survivable
Both proposed systers offer adequate survivability
in their respective displays, however, the sensors fall
under the same reasoning as above. The armored chassis,
into which the rod B IFAAR can be counted for the heavy
divisions, would offer protection frorT srall arms fire and
shrapnel. Should a comparison te drawn, usin^ electronic
counter measures (ECM) as ar element of survivability, there
are several ICCr advantages with the IFAAR that would result
in a better rating than the basic FAAK. However, the author
is not prepared to conduct ZCCP evaluations on specific
hardware.
D. CCfPARATIVF RECAPITULATION
Table VIII summarizes the results of the comparison as
broken cut icto the three categories. The notation depicts
the better system within a particular category witnout










Having compared the two proposals using the requirement
constraints and criteria, the capability for decreasing
total tirre tc engagement of eacn systeir should be
considered. The ShORAD-C2 systerr will have no effect on any
of the weapon systerr peculiar actions of the firing sequence
once the fire command has beer given by the secticn/team
leader. There are two very significant actions that are
accomplished pricr to the fire ccmrrand that consume the vast
majority of the tire in an engagement (regardless of weapon
system). They are visual acquisition of the potential
target and identifying it as either friend or hostile.
These actions equate to the "sense" and "compare" elements
of the Lawscn command and control process mentioned in
chapter ore.
The early warning capability cf the SHCR.AT-C2 system is
designed specifically to reduce the amount of time required
to perform the sensing function. For purposes of this
discussion, the visual acquisition function will include
receipt of early warning information, search, and detection
of the aircraft. Time fcr this phase starts at the instant
a sensor within the SHCRAD-C2 system detects the aircraft
and ends when the fire unit scuad/team leader detects the
aircraft .
The identification process will vary in time depending
upon range tc the aircraft, visibility, aircraft
<s2

attituae/rrofile, aircraft type (helo or fixed wing', end
the individual visual aircraft recognition proficiency. The
process results in a determination of friend, foe, or
unknown. The decision to engage or not is based on the
results of the identification process, whether correct or
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Eigure 17. Time-line Comparison
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Hgure 17 depicts the two phases mentioned above with
the acquisition phase separated into two categories. Search
ana detection will vary depending upcE the accuracy of early
warning information and the accuracy of the display device
as well as weather, terrain, angle of apprcach/crcssing
target, and the amount of air traffic. Identification is
aided Dy the use of tentative identification from the C2
system, tut the factors mentioned in the paragraph atove
create the potential fcr vide variances in the amount of
time for a positive identification.
Table IX provides a comparison of "both systems to the
current one. lach plus (minus— if applicable) sign
indicates a 5^2 improvement over the SH0RAD-C2 system in the
field today. Early warning received from HIPAE differs from













There were four requirements which received positive
ratings accompanied by a risK factor. Three were under
performance while one was a fielding requirement . Were any
cr ell of the areas sc indicated net to be realized by that
particular proposal, the potential exists for a complete
reversal of decision as to which system is the better.
Regardless of outcome, the author feels that the exercise is
necessary to force the consideration of various
eventualities .
With four ratings in question, there are numerous
combinations cf possitie outcomes ranging- from the
realization of all four capabilities to reelizirg none of
them. Without even considering partial realization of some
requirements, which would increase the number cf
combinations, there are still too many to enumerate her?.
The approach, therefore, is to first assume the worst
case situation where none of the criteria are achieved and
second, to bias the risk ratings against the proposal that
appears to be the better system. If neither of these






The tables of requirements and ratings need not be
reproduced to shew all of the ratings after forcing rislc
areas into shortfalls. The comparative recapitulation chert
(see Table X), however, shows the effect of the four
negative ratings. It appears tc create the picture of equal
systems, with one system having the advantage in
performance, the other in physical characteristics, and
equal fielding capabilities and/or limitations. A deeper
look is required .
TABLE X








There are eighteen criteria within the aoove three
categories of requirements: eight under performance, four
under fielding, and six under physical. Assuming all
criteria are of equal weight (an assumption to be addressed
later), weighting factors of 6/18, 4/16, and 6/18 should be
applied to the three categories respectively. That would
result in a slight advantage to the Iittcn proposal.
A more basic approach is to simply add up the total
positive (or negative) ratings and determine which system is
ye

better based on the larger (smaller, if counting negative)
number. Table XI shows the outccrre of this methoc, with
Litton maintaining the advantage. Were partial ratings
considered as total capabilities, the difference between











2 (plus 2 partial)





The most bias situation against the Litton proposal
would result in all three risx categories receiving negative
ratings while the Sanders proposal is assumed to achieve
success in their risk: area. Tne cutccme, in Table XII, is
less decided and warrants a look into the assumption of
equal weighting amcng individual criteria.
The order in which the categories of requirements were
presented was not random. Though all criteria were















11 (plus c partial) 12
some of the capabilities are decidedly moie important. A
system that does not alert fire units to aerial threats, for
example, is nearly worthless, while a systeir display that
requires a non-standard nicKel cadmium battery may only
mildly detract fTorr its appeal.
The majority of performance criteria are considered
essential to an automatec SHCE.AE-C2 system. Certainly
alerting and cueing are the most bas:ic requirements.
Pielaing requirements are extremely important though The
criteria about the '8b-'8€ timeframe is less binding than
the remaining three in, that category. It is, after all,
more important to field the desired system with a reasonable
delay than a less desirable system exactly on time. (There
is room for much discussion en decrees of timeliness and
desirability that will not he addressed here.) Mnelly, the
physical requirements are of lesser importance than the
first two. There are other means for coping with shortfalls
in some of these areas. Training, doctrine, tactics, and
planning are seme cf the factors that field units may modify
ye

10 tetter handle any deficiencies ic the physical criteria
group
.
A subjective weighting may be applied, whereby
performance is weighted heavily, fielding weighted even, and
physical weighted lightly. Table XIII give:s a
capsulization, by requirement categories, after weighting
has been applied. The figures to be weighted included the
biased totals (Sanders' risk rated positive ana littcn's
risks rated negative) and the partial ratings of Sanders in
the positive total for performance. Weighting was done
using the net difference per category in the following way:
the performance group counted four times, the fielding group
counted twice, and the physical group counted once.
TAELZ XIII
WEIGHTED RICAPITUIATICN






+ + 44 (heavy)
(even)
(Light)
The capability gap is narrowed considerably by biasing
the ratings, however, the advantage is still apparent. Kg
further analysis is required since the most damaging
occurance tc the system that more closely meets the desired
capabilities does not alter the outcome.
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VII. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS. AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The need tc correct SH0RAD-C2 deficiencies was
identified against the bacKdrop cf the Soviet air threat ana
the Division '86 air defense assets. The command ard
control systerr needed to perforrr two rrajor functions:
provide early warning to SHCRAL fire units, and provide
"in-proved" rreans for weapon systerr control. Tre SHCRAT-C2
office of the directorate of combat develcpments (DCD) at
Ft. Bliss, Tx. assisted in the development of a list of
constraints and criteria for the automated C2 system.
Information was rraae readily available by the respective
companies tc allow for adequate description cf component^
ana capabilities of the Sanders and Litton equipment. The
system design, based en equipment capabilities, was done by
the author to allow for complete system comparison. The
comparison that followed utilized categories cf requirements
to group ratings and subsequent discussion of the respective
system failures (or near failures) to meet statea criteria.
linally, the system that mere closely adhprea tc the
stated criteria v»as subjected to biased ratings. This
removed questions about the impact of risKs associated with
several criteria and negated the neea for further analysis.




Analysis of the two proposals produced the following
conclusions:
o The Litton proposal has the better ratings based oc
the comparison of all stated criteria.
o The Litton systerr is strong in the areas of local
processors end displays while Sanders concentrated on
radar improvements and networking the radar data
together
.
o There is only one criterion (integration with DIVAD)
in which bcth systems are deficient reflecting the
different approaches to the SHCRAD-C£ complexities.
c The Littcn proposal dees provide fire units with
increased time evailaDle to perform the visual
acquisition and aircraft identification functions
prior to the decision to engage.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
c Due to the diverse paths taken by the two companies
involved, it is recorrrrended that a hybrid system which
incorporates the advantages and overcomes the
weaknesses of each proposal be evaluated.
o Cnce the request for proposal is released and
subsequent proposals are submitted, it is recc-rmended
that a similar type analysis be conducted with all
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proposals as a rrore indeptfa study would consure






This appendix will provide detailed explanation as to
now tne author arrived at each criterion. Several criteria
were taken straight out of the letter of agreement
(reference 1) that it. Bliss, es the user, defired as
requirements . Each criteria will te stated, in brief, as
part "a" with its justification at part "b".
A. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
la. A fire unit ' iV) cannot be dependent upon only one
sensor.
lb. TaKen from the LOA at reference 1, page 2.
2a. ?U provided 15Km alerting radius.
2b. Ihis figure was arrived at by the author in the
following iranner:
(1) The uaxirrum range that ac individual can detect
an approaching target aircraft is ten Kilometers. This is
with ideal conditions of flat terrain and clear weather and
Knowing the direction cf aircraft approach.
(2) An aircraft approaching at 400 Knots will travel
apprcximately one Kilometer every five seconds or £ Km/25
sees
.
(2) The alerting capability must warn fire units
before the aircraft is within that ideal visual acquisition
1£2

range (10 km) or lose the potential for engaging aircraft at
the maxiirurr range of the weapon system. The twenty-five
second buffer (5 knr beyond acquisition range) allows for
last second crew adjustments and positioning to better
prepare itself for searching and possible aircraft
engagement
.
(4) Alerting gives only grcss positional data of
aircraft in rhe fire unit area cf interest. Updates will
track the aircraft into closer and mere accurate positional
lata, but the Initial alert is needea to ready the crew.
2a. Cue FIJ within le degrees and 3 seconds.
2b. Ft. Eliss requirement per SH0EAE-C2 briefing
entitled ADA C2 System, briefing slide number P2-10-80.
4a. Air battle "picture" to TCC displays must provide
IU status, reccrd cf previous tarck data, and integration of
HIKAE/AS data.
4b. Pages A-l thru A-Z of the draft LCA require the
excharge, processing, and display cf command information.
It also requires a consolidated "air picture". Eased on the
authors knowledge of the command functions in the TAfE, ?de
TOCs, and SHCEAD TCC, the stated criteria met the essential
elements cf information.
Sa, 6a. Cc information required by Ft! to engage A/C,
Acknowledge receipt.
So,
€t. Required by reference 1 pages 1 and 2.
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7a. Lata rust be corrpatabie with DIVAP system.
7fc. A requirement established by the author tc take
advantage of the rrany sensors that the DIVAD systems offer.
For survivability iEMCGN) purposes, the DIVAE sensors may
(od occasion) be turned off. When this occurs, the SHORAD-
C2 track data would be the only means of receiving early
warning. In addition, there should not be two separate
systerrs for passing control rrccedure inf orrraticn,
necessitating compatibility between systerrs.
8a. Integrate lon^-range oata for alerting.
6b. Frirrariiy required for corrmend post purposes, this
criterion also allows for local sensors tc fill gaps while
BIMAI sensors provide long-range data on unmestred targets.
EIMAD data rray be the cnly source of data for special (ie.
air raid, airmobile, penetration) operations where local
sensors can not accompany the weapon system.
B. HELIING KECUIflE.v ENTS
la. CT&E for worldwide use.
lb. Reference 1, page A-2.
2a. Field by '35-'86.
2b. To be available for the division 'e6 structure and
to meet the Et. Bliss schedule for en interirr system before
tne "Objective" system is available in the 19S0's.
3a. Compatible with current and HE radios.
3b. Page A-2 of LCA explains tnat the new
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ccmmunica ticns equipment will support the SHCRAD-C2. That
system will not be available in '85-'86. The SHCRAD-C2
system developed now must De compatible with equipment in
the field today ana the new equipment.
4a. Perform equally in four of the five division types.
4b. This criterion was the authors. It accounts for
the mission and equipment differences between division types
and allows fcr slight performance deveaticn based en
equipment availability.
C. PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS
la. 113 display weigh less than 10 lbs.
lb. Eased on paragraph 2a on page A-3, reference 1, the
author determined that ten pounds was the maximum that a
display could weigh if a Stinger team was to operate
dismounted. With all of the other equipment reouired, this
may well be tec much, but will act as an upper limit only.
2a, 3a. FU display standard power, easy tc operate and
weapon centered .
2b, 2c. Reference 1, page 2.
4a, ta . Sensor must be as mobile as supported unit,
survivable as supported unit.
4b, 5b. Reference 1, pages 2, A-3, A-4.
6a. System components deployable by C-130.




THE EIVISIOM IN 1986
The Combined Arms Comoat Developments Activity's (CACDA)
"Eivisicn 86 Final Report" of October 1981 is the major
source cf data for the division structure that follows.
That report is paraphrased, summarized , ard quoted
throughout this appendix. The study include! analytical
input of the force structure tradeoffs and wargaming
conducted by the Combine Arms Center (CAC). "Prior to the
division restructuring study (EPS) of 1976, the Army had
last reorganized in the mid-196es as a result cf the
Reorganization Objective Army Division (BOAD) Study." [Ref.
6: p. 1-1] In 1975 the LPS was directed to develop the
optimum, size, mix, ard organization of the Army divisions
for the 1960-1985 timeframe,. based on a reed to determine
the best use of new weapons that had been fielded and the
tactics to maximize their firepower. After months cf study
and evaluation by various headquarters, the Commander,
TRAEOC, directed that an operational concept for Division &6
be Keyed to the Battlefield Development Plan functional
tasfcs which evolved into the areas depicted at Table XIV
with the appropriate proponents. The following paragraphs





IIVISION 86 iORCE STRUCTURE FUNCTIONS/FROFONINTS
FUNCTIONS
Target Servicing
















[Ref . i : p . 1-4]
A. TARGET SERVICING
Target servicing is tne neutralization cf enerry forces
that are within line-of-s igh t ana are capable of engaging
friendly forces with their i-rirrary weapons. To service
targets ray require the seizure ana holding cf Key terrain
and ray also include the use cf supporting weapons. Target
servicing in the defense is accomplished by the covering
force as well as in the rrain tattle area and when conducting
offensive operations.
1 . TanK fattalion
The tank battalion is the rrost potent target
servicing unit in the Army. Its cross-country nobility and
ariror protection provide the shock effect desired. One or
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rrore companies may be cross attached with a rrechanized
infantry battalion to form a task force thai may te
supported by one of several units to increase the shock
effect. After several draft organizations and studies tc
«
determine the optimun mix of companies per battalion and
platoons per ccrrpany, the organization ir. Higure l£ was

































iigure 18. Division £6 Tank Battalion
2
. Mechanized Infantry Battalion
The mechanized infantry battalion provides the
flexibility tc the battalion task fcrce when fighting alcng
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side the tanK units or when operating dismounted to cold Key-
terrain, emplace or breach obstacles, repel disrooted enemy
attacks, and prcvide security cr locate the enemy &y use of
patrols, amfcushes, etc. The new mechanized rifle platoon
has the same organizational structure except for the fact
that each squad was reduced frorr eleven tc nine men. The
antiarmor company ray be deployed in centralized support of
the cattalicn cr split into platoons that are attached to




















figure 19. Division 8€ Mechanized Infantry Battalion
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To maintain symmetry with the four tarK corrpany
battalion, the mechanized infantry battalion was increased
in strength to accommodate four rifle companies, (see Figure
19) In oraer to stay within the personnel constraints,
however, one maneuver battalion was deleted from the
division structure leaving a total of ten.
3. Air Cavalry Attack Eri^ade (ACAB)
The AC A? has a diversity of irissions ranging frorr
direct fire on enemy armor and mechanized forces to
reconnaissance ard airmobile operations. The ACAE also
supports aerial logistics operations ty providing assets to
field artillery aerial observers and corrbat electronics
warfare aircraft. The brigade consists of e headquarters
company, a ccirbat support aviation tattalion, two attack
helicopter battalions, and the division cavalry squadrcr as
shewn in ?igure 'll .
The ccrrnat support aviation tattalion (CSAE)
provides direct and general support to the division by
iroving personnel, supplies and equipment and by conducting
airmobile and/cr recovery operations. The CSAE also has the
capability tc assist in the coordination effort of airspace
management. The battalion consists of an HHC , a general
support aviation company (GSAC), a combat support aviation
corrpany (CSAC), a cornet electronic warfare and intelligence




The two attack helicopter battalions (AHE) are tne
maneuver elements of the ACAE. The mission of these
battalions involve destroying enerry armor and motorized
forces. Each battalion consists of a headouarters and
service company and three attacK helicopter companies to te
employed in offensive, defensive, and special operations
such as rear area combat and raids.
The division cavalry squadron's Fission is to
perform reconnaissance in front of, to the flanKs, and to
the rear or the division. This is accorrp lished thru two
ground cavalry trocps, twc air cavalry troops, and a
headquarters troop that includes sensor and NBC
reconnaissance platcons as well as a motorcycle platcon.
lue to the nature of its mission, this squadron is normally
employed ty the division headquarters.
! ACAE ! (139 A/C)
(2344;













































Counterfire is the attach on enemy indirect fire
capabilities aad consist of target acquisition, processing,
ettacK, ana attack assessment. These tasKs involve division
field artillery as well as Air Force elements that are
integrated at the division level. The division artillery
(DIVARTY) provides non-nuclear and nuclear fires in support
of the maneuver forces and mans the fire support element in
the DTOC and division TAC CP. DIVARTY consists of an HHB, a
division target acquisition battalion (DTAB), three ittrrm
self-propelled field artillery (IA) battalions, and a
composite general support battalion with a multiple launcher
rocket system (MIRS) cattery, and two 6 inch howitzer
batteries. The 155mm iA battalions are norrrally deployed in





















1 &S BN 1
1 1
! MLRS ! S in .
BTRY
! SVC !
figure 21. Division 66 Division Artillery
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C. COMMML, CONTROL and COMMUNICATIONS (C3)
Force activities are directed, and monitored by use of
command and control which includes
"communications, control centers, and information
gathering systems ... to gather and analyze infcrma tion
,
plan what is to be dene, and supervise the execution of
orders." [Ref. 6: p. 4-1]
The three types of units that will te descrited under the
heading of C£ are the signal battalion, the military police
corrpany, and the headquarters and headquarters companies at
division and brigade.
1 . Signal Battalion
The signal battalion is responsible for the
installation, operation, ana maintenance of a division level
communications systerr. This includes command, control,
intelligence, fire ccntroi, combat support, and combat
service support. The command operations company provides
the communications electronics (CI) facilities and services
to the ETCC, division TAC CI', and division rear signal
centers and provides multi-channel communication to the
field artillery brigade, military intelligence battalion,
air defense cattalion, engineer battalion, and the air
cavalry attacK brigade.
The forward communications company establishes three
area signal centers which each provide facsimile and secure
teletype facilities, automatic telephone central office and
switching facilities, two secure FM retransmission
114

facilities, milti-channel communication terminals that linic
to the division system, and three net control units (one for
each cripade signal center) for operating- in the division
position location reporting systerr / joint tactical
information distri Duticn system (PIES/JTIDS) hytrid system.
The signal support operations conpary provides a signal
center for the DISCOM and IIVAETY and provides multi-channel
relays and field cable construction for the division as well

















figure 22. Eivision 86 Signal Battalion
2. military Police Company
The military police company will typically operate
betina tee forward brigades rear boundaries and back to the
division rear. The mission includes providing area support
to the ETCC, EISCC^, main supply routes (PSHs), ell source
US

analysis center, and to establish eneiry prisoner of war
collection points. There ere three cor bat support military
police platoons to perform movement control, area security,
prisoner of war operations, ana lav end order operation in
the division rear.
3 . rivis ion/Br igade Headquarters ard Feada uarters
Comranv (EEC)
The division and brigade HHCs include the staffs
that assist in the performance of command and control, staff
planning, and supervision of both administration and
operation of assigned and attached units. The commanders
ray be in tneir respective rain CPs cr in rrcbile or tactical
CPs where only designated staff personnel deemed necessary
to maintain continuity ct essential elerents of command and
control are accessible tc the ccrrrrarder
.
E. INTSLIIGINCI, SUEVEILANCI ANE TAEGIT ACQUISITION (ISTA)
ISTA means "locating, classifying, prrjectinsr, and
providing target information tc The connarder concerning
seccnd-echelcn interdiction operations". [?ef. 6: p. 5-1]
The division headquarters must plan operations and allocate
resources up tc 24 hours into the future. While forward
elements are in contact and engaging forces from the ?LCT to
a depth of 15 Km, the division interdiction missions affect
enemy forces from the FLCT to a depth of 70 Km.
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The military intelligence cattalion (CEVil) is the
primary focal point for information concerning enemy rear
area forces. Id the headquarters and operations company,
the all-scurce analysis center integrates HUMINT, IM INI and
SIGINT collections to support target development on enemy
activities. The electronic warfare company provides an
HINT collection and locating system, a CCMMINT collection.
and line of tearing data and ECM. A signal intelligence
processing platoon provide analyzers of SIGINT data. The
intelligence and surveilance company interrogate FO'as and
provide CPS5C/SIGSIC support. The service support corpany
provides the ccmmunicat icrs and direct support maintenance
on the battalion's organic equipment. The aviation company
is under operational control of the C3EVI comrander and
provides corrmand and control for the attached assets, air
defense threat personnel to the ASAC, six target acquisition
aircraft for Mil radar collection, and six aircraft
COMINT/ESM collection/jamming.
or
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Eigure cZ. livision 66 Military Intelligence Battalion
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E. MOBILITY, CCUNTSP.MOBILITY ANT SUBVIVAE II ITY
Forces whose mission is categorized as supporting
mobility, countermobility and survivability involve
"operations to Keep the tactical forces and logistics
moving, deny the enemy ready access to the division
operational area and provide for survival of
tt
forces ana
installations vital to division operations". ["Ret. 6:
p. 6-1]
The two units primarily responsible for performing these
missions are the ergineer battalion and the NEC ccrrpany.
1 . Toe Ingineer Battalion
The engineer battalion generally allocates the
organic units ana equipment in support of the maneuver
elements. The engineer conpanies are placed in direct
support of each committed naneuver brigade and each company
may be augmented by battalion equipment and/or corps
engineer equipment and personnel. lach company has a
heaaquarters section, a combat engineer platoon, a
mobility /countermobility platoon and a support platoon. The
combat engineer platoon is transported by armored personnel
carriers and supported by a combat engineer vehicle and two
earth movers. The platoons normally operate in direct
support of tasK forces to provide mobility to the combat
elements. The platoons are also capable of emplacing
explosives or r cn-explcsive obstacles to halt or slow enemy
ad vences .
The mcbility/countermofcili ty platoon now has 24
armorea vehicles launchea bridges (AVIIJ to provide mobility
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over difficult terrain. The platoon also has the capability
to lay and clear rrines. The cridge ccrrpany provides limited
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ligure 24. Division e6 Engineer Battalion
2. Nuclear. Biological and Chemical (NBC) Company
The NEC company provides decontamination and smoKe
support to the division. SmoKe is used in both offensive
end defensive operations and an NBC center operates the NEC
warning and reporting system and provides ether NBC data
handling services. The decontamination platoons, placed in
direct support of each brigade, provide equipment and
119

expertise in aecontarri na t ion operations. The stroke platoon
is norrraliy employed in support of maneuver elements but ray-
be used in rear area operations as i*ell.
F. EATTLI SUPFCST/RICONSTITDTICN
Battle suppcrt requires providing- committed forces those
supplies ana services neelea to conduct their designated
operations. Additionally, such services as medical, graves
registration
,
battlefield recovery, repair ana resupply of
ammunition and fuel are accomplished. Reconsti tution
requires rebuilding the force to include people,
organizations, command structures and material.
Sattle suppcrt is conducted at all levels from company
tnru division from trains areas as well as brigade support
areas (ESA) ana division suppcrt areas (DSA). Some corps
limits may operate in the ISA. The support concept requires
tae supporting elements to provide support (to include
repair) as far forward as possible and evacuating from
forward locating points to the appropriate direct support or
general support unit.
The division suppcrt command (DISCCM) provides direct
suppcrt and/or general support tc divisional units and
consists cf a division material management center (EMtfC), an
adjutant general company, a maintenance battalion, a medical
battalion and three forward suppcrt battalions. The
division data center is a common-user computer system that
120

assists DISCC^ personnel in developing requirements and
iraraging stccKs in forward support, supply ana transport,
aviation ard rraintenance cattaiions. It is used to develop
and monitor ASI/1II and assists in tne management of
division maintenance activities. The Dr.MC establishes and
maintains a centralized property dock for all division
units.
ElSCCr" j
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